The Russians and the French have advised the United States not to attack Iraq. They say it would make the U.S. even more hated in the Islamic world, and would look like the U.S. is positioning itself in the role of world policeman, acting at will and potentially gaining unilateral advantages in the process.

The logical extension of their argument is for them, themselves, to take responsibility for removing Saddam Hussein.

This would have a number of advantages. The two countries could easily secure the necessary UN resolution and make the action genuinely look like it resulted from decisions made by the international community, not a lone superpower. It would head off accusations of American arrogance and breach of international law. It would spare us the old French spectator sport – rapidly becoming a Russian one as well – of moralizing at the expense of the U.S., even while raking in the benefits of American sacrifices. It would share the risks and burdens of fighting, along with the glories. It would confound the extremist wings of Islam and Arab nationalism, diffusing and defusing their hatreds.

Of course, the Russians and the French could beg off on the grounds that they're not up to such an action technologically. However, the U.S. could offer them use of its own hi-tech weaponry in a support capacity. After all, the U.S. wouldn't want its allies to get bogged down in an unending bloody mess. If others lack the technology to keep a war relatively clean, U.S. capabilities can be put on loan, flying under a French flag. (Russia-NATO cooperation isn't advanced enough for U.S. forces to fly under a Russian flag; that will have to wait for a later day.)

Presumably, the allies would come to an agreement on objectives: a regime change, reconstruction of the country, destruction of all weapons of mass destruction and all programs for developing such weapons, authority for continued intrusive inspections, and, particularly important in view of the fear that the U.S. is getting one-sided advantages from its interventions, a fair sharing of influence on the future Iraq.

If the allies wanted to play clever, they could put out a cover story saying they were moving in to protect Iraq from American attack. This, they would add, would require new Iraqi leadership that the world could trust.

The cover story might not last long, but even a few days – given the past connections of France and Russia with the country – might be enough to split the regime's forces and get cooperation from local elites. It might work better than an opposition-led strategy, which is what is usually discussed in connection with a U.S. attack.

So why not go ahead with it? What is standing in the way of this pleasant fantasy?

At this point we have to admit a dirty little secret: Russia and France, after all their complaining about U.S. leadership, take it for granted that the U.S. is inevitably the leader and that their own place is one of follower.

However, unlike Britain or Italy, they play the follower's game unfaithfully: they act as freeloaders and perennial critics. This gives them a temporary shot in the arm, an ersatz feeling of national dignity. They make a big fuss about having "their own" interests, trying hard to forget that the main interest is the one they share with everyone else. In the end they usually trade in their criticisms for some petty side-benefits.

In their sober moments, Russia and France know the costs of this game are greater than its advantages. The costs come in every form: damage to the interests of the international community as a whole (interests in which Russia and France also have a big stake); increases in the risk and cost incurred by the world community in ultimately realizing its common interests; loss of self-respect for Russia and France; loss of America's former respect for them; misleading their own public and whipping up anti-Americanism – something which, incidentally, makes it impossible for any regime to fine-tune this little game.

As long as Russia and France accept the game, in which they have been, as the saying goes, "pensioned off by history," there is nothing more to be hoped for. It will remain a lose-lose situation.

But before we accept this outcome as inevitable, let's take one last wistful glance at the other side of the ledger – the side of a Franco-Russian move on Iraq. Here there are some major advantages for Russia and France, as well as for the world at large: regaining their stature as great powers; regaining dignity in the eyes of their own people; regaining the respect of their allies; resolving the Iraq crisis at a lower cost and a greater benefit to all sides; and last but not least, clearing the air – all the accumulated stuffy air of years of second-guessing from the sidelines – in their dialogue with their great American ally.

It would genuinely be a new start for Russian-American relations.