Three new flags — those of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic— have been raised at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

The event should have put an end to discussions over the past five years about whatconsequences the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance will have for Russia.

After having received a tonne of guarantees, Russian generals keep returning to theissue of Russian national security. In a way, they are right: There is no reason whyRussia's military leadership should take vows of friendship and co-operation at facevalue. Military planning follows its own harsh laws, and what counts are not earnestdeclarations, but the real military potential of one's neighbours. If this logic isfollowed, NATO's eastward expansion cannot be perceived as anything other than athreat.

The problem is, that by following this philosphy, generals end up seeing speculativethreats as real. It is clear to everybody, including the military, that NATO expansiondoes not pose a direct armed threat. There is nothing to suggest that NATO plans to makeuse of the military and strategic advantages obtained through an eastward expansion. Whatis the point in discussing how to react to NATO deployment of its forces and nuclearweapons against Russia, when nothing of the sort has taken place and perhaps never will?

Arguments that Russia could be caught unaware do not hold up. NATO is not Nazi Germanyand is not in any position to prepare for a large-scale invasion in secret. All decisionson action, even in emergency situations, are made by the governments of the 16 memberstates through a complex process of negotiations. Russian officers working at NATO areconvinced that these procedures and the constant search for consensus rule out anypossibility of the alliance secretly preparing for war. It is also clear that Russia isnot able to provide a military response to NATO's eastward expansion. In allprobability, there are no plans to build up Russian military potential as a response tothe perceived threat from the West. Talk of NATO's military superiority is seen inMoscow as being a means of strengthening Russia's position in negotiations onupdating the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

The Duma has just held another session on the military threat to Russia presented byNATO's expansion. Colonel-General Valerii Manilov, General Headquarters first deputyhead of the armed forces, said that with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joiningNATO, "the alliance's zone of responsibility will extend 650 to 750 kilometresfurther eastward."

He added that with the three new members, the European group's ground forces wouldbe increased by 12 divisions. Manilov also said that based in Poland, NATO tacticalaviation would be able to strike within a radius extending as far as St. Petersburg,Murmansk, Kursk, Smolensk and Voronezh. He said that this would give tactical aviationstrategic significance. The general noted that the entrance of the three new members"will enable NATO to strategically position their forces far more quickly, whilegiving Russia less time to ready its own forces."

Colonel-General Yuri Bukreiev, head of the ground forces department, said that withPoland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, NATO would have 54 divisions in Europe, whileRussia has only three. It had been thought that the signing in May 1997 of the FoundingAct between Russia and NATO would calm such fears. The document, drawn up by RussianForeign Minister Evgenii Primakov and NATO Secretary General Xavier Solana, containedcertain guarantees for which Moscow had asked.

NATO representatives agreed to stipulate in writing that NATO "has no intention,plans, or need" to place nuclear weapons on the territory of future member states.This provision was backed up by the commitment not to stock nuclear weapons on theterritory of future member states, or to use bases inherited from the Warsaw Pact.

Regarding conventional weapons, Russian diplomats say they were able to persuade NATOto renounce operational measures that would pose a direct threat to Russia. Of particularconcern was the prospect of NATO member states building up their national forces bybringing in additional forces from other member states. It was agreed that new NATO stateswould not undertake this policy unless they were directly threatened with attack.

Finally, the two parties also established a specific body: the NATO-Russia Council.This council provides for consultations twice a year between Russian foreign and defenceministers and those of NATO member states. Moscow has no veto rights within the council.But the council does give Russia the opportunity to influence NATO decisions, a uniqueprivilege for a non-member. This is important because through the council Russia will havean influence on decisions in such key areas as peacekeeping in Europe, military planning,the development of military doctrines and joint action in emergency situations.

As NATO continues its internal transformation, other opportunities are emerging forRussia to _have an influence on the bloc's policies. This concerns most the Europeancomponent of NATO's security. Over the past few years, it has become increasinglyclear that the security interests of Western Europe and those of the United States do notalways correspond. To set up military organisations independent of NATO, however, would beseen as a serious challenge to the United States' role as world leader.

The solution, found with difficulty, was to increase the role of the Western EuropeanUnion (WEU), the defence organisation formed by a group of Western European countries thatare also NATO members.

The union would carry out its own military operations, and within NATO there would beheadquarters and command structures and army units that would be placed under WEU commandif need be. This "divisible but undivided potential," as it was referred to, wasto be made available for purely European operations.

But putting all this into practice was not so simple. The whole structure of NATO hasdeveloped around the central role of the United States, and introducing a Europeancomponent into intelligence, communications and transport, has proved immensely difficult.It is for this reason that plans have gone no further than declarations on the formationof multinational tactical forces that would be placed under the command of the WEU.

Clearly, Russian generals would not be against the idea of integrating with WesternEuropean military structures and would willingly play a part in "purelyEuropean" operations.

It seems then that an ambiguous attitude toward NATO reigns in the Russian military. Itis no accident that Russian military men still have not figured out exactly what to calltheir NATO counterparts. It would not seem quite right to call them the "potentialenemy," but at the same time, the word "partner" does not come easily tothe tonnegue either. Now NATO member states are now referred to as"counter-partners." One thing is now evident - the Russian military is notnearly as afraid of NATO as it likes to pretend it is.