J ust as this author predicted, barely a week after Russia's brilliant operation in Kosovo-culminating in the seizure of Pristina Airport-Russian generals were complaining of a stolen victory.

After three days of intensive talks, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev and U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen reached an agreement on Russian participation in the Kosovo peacekeeping operation. As a result, Russian nationalists now have every reason to add the names of Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Defense Minister Igor Sergeev to Presidential Special Envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin's, which is already on a list of the country's traitors.

It took only a few days for the Russian operation in Kosovo - initially producing the impression of a great military and political success -to turn into a soap bubble. The West acceded to none of Moscow's conditions. Russia was demanding a separate sector in Kosovo. Instead it will only deploy two battalions within the American sector, command the Pristina Airport within the British sector, and deploy a battalion in the French sector and one in the German.

The U.S. president devised an appropriate explanation for the outcome, arguing Russian troops needed to be dispersed across Kosovo to ensure cooperation from the province's Serb population. But one need only look at a map to see Russia is effectively excluded from all areas adjacent to Serbia.

In effect, NATO is eliminating the possibility of Serb refugees concentrating in the Russian sector - which might have led to the partition of Kosovo. Moreover, one need not be a genius to understand that the deployment finally agreed upon effectively undermines the provision in the agreement stating the Russian contingent must be under Moscow's direct command.

In reality, Russian battalions will need to coordinate any actions with the American, French or German NATO sector commander. This command system proved effective in Bosnia. In Kosovo, it will eventually see Russian officers appointed deputies to British Lt. Gen. Sir Mich-ael Jackson, the commander of the NATO-led peacekeeping force, and respective sector commanders.

Orders to Russian troops will be conveyed through these officers and any disputed issue will be resolved after discussions with Moscow. In truth, all of that could have been achieved without jeopardizing Russia's relations with the West.

The decision to send 200 paratroopers to Pristina was doomed from the start. Strategists in Moscow who devised the operation anticipated using the captured airstrip to bring in reinforcements from Russia. Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria, however, refused to provide an air corridor for these troops. It seems the Russian generals may have forgotten the Warsaw Pact no longer exists.

But that is not the main point.

The Russian operation in Kosovo was overtly anti-NATO and confrontational in nature. Russian officers at general headquarters love to recall "the Americans' jaws dropping" when U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot received the call from Washington informing him Russian troops had entered Pristina. While the final (publicly declared) goal was to improve Russia's position to better cooperate with NATO in Kosovo, Russian generals demanded that the Russian contingent in the province be answerable only to Moscow. At the same time, however, the Russian paratroopers that took Pristina airport had KFOR inscribed on the armor of their vehicles - acknowledging they were part of the joint peacekeeping force.

Russian paratroopers in Pristina found themselves effectively cut off from their bases and short of food, ammunition and fuel. To support them, the Russian military command sent a truck convoy from Bosnia.

Touching, really.

In addition to vital provisions, the convoy carried some money for the paratroopers to at least be able to buy food in Pristina. Thankfully, the British gave the Russian paratroopers some water and a hand in guarding the airport.